Abstract. This paper takes a specific routing protocol as an example and formally analyzes the protocol in a machine-assisted theorem proving tool Isabelle/HOL, to prove that routing protocols in wireless networks can be attacked by designing particular attacking schemes and can also be protected from attacks by modifying protocol contents. The paper first gives the specification of the routing protocol and formal definition of the attacker, and then finds the security vulnerability in the routing protocol through strict logical analysis.
Introduction
In future, large information will be transmitted and processed in wireless networks. If there are security vulnerabilities in wireless network routing protocols, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to perform attacks, which may lead to information leakage, communication interruption, or the injection of false information. Therefore, it is necessary to make a detailed analysis of the security vulnerabilities before using a wireless network routing protocol.
Generally, two methods are available to carry out the analysis: simulation test and formal verification. Due to the limitations of the simulation test, people often resort to more scientific and rigorous formal verification in the design and development of critical concurrent systems (such as routing protocols) [1] . To the best of our knowledge, many scholars have formally analyzed the wireless network routing protocols [2] [3] [4] , but only a few deal with secure routing protocols. Furthermore, many of these cited works are done with simulation test or model checking method. Since simulation test model checking does not scale well, these works can only deal with models with a very small number of nodes. For instance, paper [3] discusses only a 5-node model. In this paper, the strict logic reasoning and proof of a wireless routing protocol, the SAODV protocol [5] , is carried out in the machine assisted theorem proving tool Isabelle/HOL [6] . The paper formally proves the safety properties of the protocol, finds its security vulnerabilities, and designs the attacking scheme using the security vulnerabilities. As a result of the theorem proving method, the conclusion is not limited to the number of nodes.
Formal Specification of SAODV and the Attacks Formal Definition of Concurrent Systems
Concurrent refers to the occurrence of multiple activities at the same time. Tightly coupled parallel systems, loosely coupled distributed systems, computer protocols, and network routing protocols can be viewed as concurrent systems. According to the definition of a concurrent system in [7] , the type of a concurrent system is (' ' ) a list a set  , and the concurrent system is written as cs . The type of a system state is defined as ' a list , and the system state is written as  . The expression ( , ) e cs   means that the event e is legitimate to happen under the system state  according to the concurrent system cs . Some definitions in Isabelle/HOL are given in Figure 1 .
If a concurrent system is composed of two subsystems 1 cs and 2 cs , the system is defined as 1 2 cs cs ∪ . We use the composition operator "||" to represent it as follows. 
Security Policy of SAODV
The SAODV protocol is a secure routing protocol for wireless networks, based on the non-secure routing protocol AODV [8] . SAODV provides some security mechanisms to protect the route discovery process. It assumes the existence of a key management subsystem, which enables each node to obtain the public keys of other nodes and verifies whether a given public key is matched to a given node. SAODV uses two mechanisms to protect routing messages: digital signatures and hash chains. Digital signatures are used to ensure the integrity of the non-mutable part of the routing message, and hash chains are used to ensure the mutable part (Hop) not be tampered. In fact, hash chain cannot prevent malicious attackers increasing the hop count value. Nevertheless, it is meaningless to increase the hop count value since nodes keep only the route with a smaller number of hops.
Hash Chains in SAODV. According to the AODV specification, the intermediate nodes will add the hop count field to 1 before forwarding the routing request message (RREQ) and routing reply message (RREP). As there is no protection to the hop count field, the attacker can arbitrarily increase or decrease the value of the number of hops. Hash chains are used in SAODV to authenticate the hop count of the routing messages (not only by end points, but by any node that receives one of those routing request and reply messages).
Every time a node wants to send a RREQ or a RREP, it generates a random number (seed), selects a Maximum Hop Count. The Maximum Hop Count should be set to the Time To Live (TTL) value in the IP header, and it should never exceed its configuration parameter NET_DIAMETER. The Hash field in the Signature Extension is set to the seed. The Top Hash field is set to the seed hashed Max Hop Count Times. Every time a node receives a RREQ or a RREP it verifies the hop count by hashing (Max Hop Count -Hop Count) times the Hash field, and checking that the resultant value is the same as the Top Hash. If the check fails, the node should drop the packet.
Before rebroadcasting a RREQ or forwarding a RREP, a node hashes one time the Hash field in the Signature Extension. The function used to computer the hash is set in the Hash Function field. Since this field is signed, a forwarding node will only be able to use the same hash function that the originator of the routing message has selected. If a node cannot verify or forward a routing message because it does not support the hash function that has been used, then it drops the packet. Digital Signatures in SAODV. SAODV uses digital signatures to protect the integrity of the non-mutable parts of the RREQ and RREP. Except the Hop field and the Hash Value field, the other fields of the RREQ and RREP should not be changed during transmission. Every node generating and forwarding a RREQ or a RREP should use digital signatures to sign the non-mutable parts of the RREQ and RREP, and every node generating and forwarding a routing error message (RERR) should use digital signatures to sign the whole message. When a node receives a routing message, it first verifies integrity of the signature before transferring and updating its routing table.
The public key in SAODV is defined as a function on a Boolean value and a node. If the Boolean value is true, the public key represents a signature public key pubSK ; otherwise, it represents an encrypted public key pubEK . Because the public key publicKey is a function defined on a Boolean value and a node, the public keys of any two nodes are different and the private keys of any two nodes are also different. In addition, because True is not equal to False, the signing key of any node is different from the encryption key of this node. We assume any private key is not equal to any public key, so that the confidentiality of private keys can be guaranteed. 
Routing Message in SAODV
Each node maintains a routing table, which records only one path to the destination node. The fields in the routing table are as follows:
(1) Destination IP Address: The destination node, abbreviated as Dest ; 
In this definition:
The Node is the node field. The Qid is the routing request message identifier field, which is randomly generated by the source node and used to uniquely identify the route request message.
The Sig is the signature field.
The Hash is the hash function field. The Dat is the data field. The message in SAODV is defined as follows: 
Formal Definition of Attackers
If attackers in a wireless network can do anything, even the most secure routing protocol will fail. Since it is impossible for an attacker to do anything, we can define an event set and specify that any attacker should not be able to generate any event in this set. The event set is called fail set. Then our formal proof has a premise: attackers cannot generate any event in the fail set. If it is reasonable to explain the definition of the fail set, the entire proof is reasonable. The fail set is changed with the system state  , so it is defined on a function of the system state:
The fail set is expressed as  fail . And the attackers are defined as follows: In this paper, SAODV is divided into two subsystems: the subsystem saodv and the subsystem attacker fail . The subsystem saodv describes the behavior of common nodes according to the SAODV protocol, and the subsystem attacker fail describes the behavior of the attackers in the network. So the whole system is formally described as || saodv attacker fail .
Formal Analysis and Proof of the Safety Properties
The loop free property is one of the most important safety properties for distance-vector routing protocols, especially for wireless network routing protocols. Because the topology of a wireless network is dynamic, the routing is often in an unstable state. In this case, the loop free property is more important for wireless network routing protocols to keep practicability and stability. 
Formal Description of the Loop Free Property
If the next hop to destination node D points to node B in the routing table of node A, and at the same time, the next hop to destination node D points to node A in the routing table of node B, the network has been formed in a loop. In this scenario, a two-node-loop is present between node A and node B. It is formally described as follows:
Similarly, for the routes to the same destination node D, if node A points to node B, node B points to the node C, and node C points to the node A, a three-node-loop will be present between node A, node B, and node C. It is formally described as follows:
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And so on, the N-node-loop is formally described as follows:
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We should prove that it is impossible to generate any loop in the routing tables of all nodes. The following expression means that any loop will not be formed between any 1  n nodes:
The Problem Found when Proving the Loop Free Property
In the process of proving the loop free property using Isabelle/HOL, we found that only on the assumption that the attacker does not change the source IP addresses of the RREQ and the RREP, the loop free property can be formally proved. Since the IP addresses of routing messages are not protected by the hash chain and the digital signature in SAODV, any attacker can cause a loop in the network by changing the source IP addresses of the RREQ and the RREP.
Security Vulnerabilities of SAODV
The hash chain in SAODV can only ensure that the hop count value is not decreased, and the digital signature can only guarantee the integrity of the non-mutable part of the routing message. However, the IP head belongs to the mutable part in the transmission process of routing messages. So the attacker can tamper with the IP head in the routing message and initiate an attack. An example in Figure 2 is given to illustrate that an attacker changes the source IP address of the routing message, which leads to a routing loop. As shown in Figure 2 , after an attacker receives a RREQ broadcast from source node S, it changes the source IP address of the RREQ from node S to node B, and then broadcasts the RREQ. When node A receives this RREQ, node A will create a route to node S in its routing table, and the next hop node of this route is set to the source IP address of the RREQ, which has been tampered to node B. And then node A rebroadcasts this RREQ. When node B receives this RREQ from node A, node B will create a route to node S in its routing table, and the next hop node of this route is set to node A. Now, a loop is formed: for the same destination node S, node A has a route pointing to node B, and node B has a route pointing to node A. If an attacker tampers the source IP address of the RREP using the same policy, it will also form loops in the routing tables. This security vulnerability can be used to form a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, which may lead to the failure of the entire network. Reversely, we also can prevent attackers from attacking our own wireless networks by modifying our routing protocols.
Summary
It is necessary to make a detailed and formal analysis of the security vulnerabilities in a wireless network routing protocol before using it. This paper takes the SAODV protocol as an example to formally analyze the safety properties in the machine-assisted theorem proving tool Isabelle/HOL. The formal specification of the routing protocol and the formal definition of attackers are given in Isabelle/HOL. A security vulnerability of the routing protocol is found during formal proof of the safety properties. The results show that some particular attacking scheme can be designed according to the vulnerability of the routing protocol, and our own routing protocols can also be modified to prevent attacks.
